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ABSTRACT 
This project analyzes the United States Coast Guard’s (USCG) involvement in 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts. In recent years, the USCG 
responded to significant natural disasters such as the Haitian earthquake of 2010 and 
Hurricanes Harvey and Maria of 2017, testing the capabilities of the service. This project 
analyzes two HA/DR events and identifies the contributions of USCG to the unified 
effort of a national and international response. Disaster events often share similar needs; 
however, the location and framework of response efforts often yield dissimilar utilization 
of capabilities and competencies. Using the essential services and capabilities for disaster 
response and humanitarian and military core competencies frameworks, we studied the 
capabilities shared between two distinctly different response efforts. We researched the 
defining characteristics of disaster events, the response frameworks, doctrine, and 
publications that govern USCG, federal, and state agency action, and historical records 
and after-action reports of the disasters involving a USCG response. Through this 
research, we hope to provide a clear understanding of how the USCG is best utilized 
during a relief response and the unique capabilities it contributes, primarily while 
operating within the joint environment. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................1 
B. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................3 
II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................5 
A. SCOPE ........................................................................................................5 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ...............................................5 
C. LIMITATIONS ..........................................................................................6 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................6 
1. Disasters Defined ............................................................................7 
2. Disaster Classification ...................................................................7 
3. Phases of Disaster ...........................................................................9 
4. Capabilities and Core Competencies .........................................10 
5. Domestic Response Framework..................................................14 
6. International Response Framework ...........................................21 
7. United States Coast Guard HA/DR Operations ........................22 
III. CASE STUDIES ...................................................................................................25 
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE ..........................................................................25 
B. HURRICANE HARVEY.........................................................................29 
IV. ANALYSIS ...........................................................................................................33 
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE ..........................................................................33 
1. Information and Knowledge Management ................................33 
2. Needs Assessment .........................................................................34 
3. Supply............................................................................................36 
4. Deployment and Distribution......................................................37 
5. Health Service Support................................................................39 
6. Collaboration and Governance ...................................................41 
B. HURRICANE HARVEY.........................................................................43 
1. Information and Knowledge Management ................................43 
2. Needs Assessment .........................................................................44 
3. Supply............................................................................................45 
4. Deployment and Distribution......................................................46 
5. Health Service Support................................................................46 
6. Collaboration and Governance ...................................................47 
viii 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................49 
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE SUMMARY....................................................49 
B. HURRICANE HARVEY SUMMARY ..................................................52 
C. USCG UNIQUE CAPABILITIES ..........................................................54 
D. THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................55 
E. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................56 
F. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH ...................................................................57 
APPENDIX. EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION ................................................59 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................63 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Natural Disaster Trends 1940–2018. Source: EM-DAT (2019). .................2 
Figure 2. Explaining Disasters. Source: Van Wassenhove (2006). .............................8 
Figure 3. Classification of Disasters. Source: Apte (2009). ........................................9 
Figure 4. Humanitarian and Disaster Response Core Competencies. Source: 
Apte & Yoho (2012). .................................................................................10 
Figure 5. Essential Services and Capabilities of Disaster Response. Source: 
Apte & Yoho (2012). .................................................................................11 
Figure 6. Humanitarian and Core Competencies. Source: Apte & Yoho (2012). .....14 
Figure 7. State and Local Response Structure. Source: DHS (2016). .......................17 
Figure 8. ICS Organization with a Single Incident Command. Source: 
National Incident Management (2017). .....................................................19 
Figure 9. Damage Incurred by Haiti Earthquake. Source: Pallardy (n.d.). ...............26 
Figure 10. JTF Personnel Strength over Time. Source: Cecchine et al. (2013). .........29 
Figure 11. Hurricane Harvey’s Path. Source: McCollum (2017). ...............................31 
Figure 12. Humanitarian and Core Competencies: DoD and USCG. Adapted 
from Apte & Yoho (2012). ........................................................................56 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. USCG Haiti Response................................................................................51 
Table 2. USCG Hurricane Harvey Response ...........................................................53 
Table 3. Emergency Support Functions and ESF Coordinator Tables. Source: 
DHS (2016). ...............................................................................................59 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AToN  aids to navigation 
CG  Coast Guard 
CGC  Coast Guard Cutter 
DART  disaster assistance response team 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DHS-HIRT Haiti Incident Response Team 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoS Department of State 
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
EOC emergency operation center 
EMT emergency medical technician 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ESF emergency support function 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
HA/DR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
HAST humanitarian assistance survey team 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 
IC Incident Commander 
ICP incident command post 
ICS incident command system 
IMT incident management team 
JIC joint information center 
JIS joint information system 
JTF-HAITI Joint Task Force-Haiti 
LANTAREA United States Coast Guard Atlantic Area 
LNO liaison officer 
MA mission assignment 
MAC multiagency coordination 
MEDEVAC medical evacuation 
xiv 
MTSRU Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit 
NGO non-governmental organization 
NIMS National Incident Management System 
NMO non-military organization 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOC national operation center 
NRCC national response coordination center 
NRF National Response Framework 
OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
PACAREA United States Coast Guard Pacific Area 
RFF request for forces 
RMT response management team 
RRCC regional response coordination center 
RS rescue swimmer 
SAR search and rescue 
SOP standard operating procedure 
SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command 
TACON tactical control 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USG United States government 




We want to thank our advisors, Aruna Apte and Philip Candreva, for providing us 
with the wisdom, guidance, and encouragement throughout this process. Thank you both 








The U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) doctrine mandates that it must be “prepared to 
respond to any unexpected incident, including deliberate events and natural disasters” (U.S. 
Coast Guard [USCG], 2012, p. 12). Given that a large portion of the world’s population 
resides in coastal areas, the Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes that environmental 
events impact the maritime security environment. A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st 
Century Seapower states that “climate change, enhanced storms, rising sea levels, and 
coastal flooding are disproportionately affecting island nations. This may trigger social 
instability and more frequent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations” (U.S. 
Navy, 2015, p. 6). The Coast Guard’s agility and significant experience in integrated 
multiagency operations provide leadership and guidance during national and international 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts. Coast Guard Publication 3–0 
(2012) defines “crisis leadership, command and control, and incident management” (p. 12) 
as some of the USCG’s core competencies. Given these doctrinal core competencies, we 
seek to identify the best utilization of the USCG during disaster relief operations and the 
unique capabilities it contributes primarily while operating within the joint environment. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The frequency of natural disasters increased significantly within the last 50 years, 
reaching its peak between 2000 and 2010. Figure 1 shows the number of disasters per 
specific continents for the years 1940–2018. In 2017 alone, a total of 335 natural disasters 
affected 95.6 million people, killing 9,697 and costing $335 billion (Centre for Research 
on the Epidmiology of Disasters [CRED], 2019). Disaster response has occurred 
throughout history, but recent years have created an increased focus on better preparing for 
and responding to HA/DR events across the entire response framework.  
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Figure 1. Natural Disaster Trends 1940–2018. Source: EM-DAT (2019). 
HA/DR operations were scrutinized again when Hurricane Katrina decimated the 
Gulf Coast in August 2005. Hurricane Katrina is the most expensive hurricane in U.S. 
history and is also one of the five deadliest hurricanes, causing 1,833 fatalities and nearly 
$125 billion in damage (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 
2016). The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 added multiple 
provisions and amendments to prior disaster relief acts in the hope of better responding to 
both domestic and international disasters. On January 12, 2010, a disaster tested the 
international response of the United States when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake, only 25 
kilometers southwest of Port-au-Prince, devastated the small country of Haiti. In the 
aftermath, the earthquake killed over 230,000, injured 300,000, and left roughly one 
million people homeless (Guha-Sapir, Kirsch, Dooling, Sirois and DerSarkissian, 2011). 
The earthquake decimated the country’s infrastructure, air and sea transport facilities 
became inoperable, hospitals were destroyed, and access to critical roads was blocked with 
debris (DiOrio, 2010). The relief effort was extraordinarily complex and encompassed a 
variety of different response organizations from all over the globe.  
Again in 2017, the United States was rocked by a series of storms that became 
known as the fifth-most active season since records began in 1851, according to the 
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National Hurricane Center (USCG, 2018a). There were 17 named storms, six of which the 
National Hurricane Center named as major hurricanes (USCG, 2018a). Hurricanes Harvey, 
Irma, Maria, and Nate were directly responsible for the deaths of 257 individuals and 
billions of dollars of infrastructure damage (CRED, 2019). Each hurricane was unique, 
adding to the complexity of the response efforts and challenging the response framework. 
Humanitarian relief and disaster response present unique challenges and varying 
demands, and they require an optimal organizational response. With the rise of HA/DR and 
a corresponding population-level increase, the need for U.S. government assets executing 
a coordinated effort with the appropriate resources and capabilities is ever crucial to 
minimizing the economic and human impacts of these disasters. No single agency has the 
capability structure or resources to comprehensively respond to a specific event (USCG, 
2011). Response agencies, including the DoD, bring a unique set of capabilities to meet 
the supply and demand of disasters. Disasters present widely varying requirements, and the 
evaluation of needs to match capabilities with those that are required to respond to a 
disaster effectively is critical to facilitating an appropriate and efficient response (Apte & 
Yoho, 2012).  
B. PURPOSE 
The Coast Guard is the nation’s premier maritime first-responder. HA/DR is a 
mission set that falls within the scope of the USCG core competencies. Using the essential 
services and capabilities for disaster response and humanitarian and military core 
competencies frameworks (Apte & Yoho, 2012), we research the capabilities shared 
between two distinctly different response efforts. Through this research, we hope to 
provide a clear understanding of how the USCG is best utilized during a relief response 








In this chapter, we identify the scope and methodology used for this research 
project. We provide our methodology on the data collected and explain how it was used to 
analyze the response efforts of the USCG. We then describe the limitations that were 
identified throughout the research. The final section is a literature review, which 
encompasses the doctrine and policy that guide both domestic and international HA/DR 
operations, and the doctrine and policy that drives the USCG response effort. 
A. SCOPE 
Our analysis of the USCG’s response to HA/DR involved case studies of domestic 
and international disasters. The two cases studied were the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017. The Haiti earthquake offered an example of an international 
response, including significant participation by international partners, the DoD, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), while the response to Hurricane Harvey represented 
an example of a national response. Due to typical response roles of the USCG, we limited 
our scope to sudden-onset and localized disasters to narrow the focus on immediate actions 
during the response phase of a disaster. During large-scale, sudden-onset disasters, the DoD 
historically provides a significant contribution of assets and logistics response capacity 
during the response and recovery phases. The USCG does not have the logistics capacity 
or depth of assets compared to the DoD; therefore, our scope did not focus on the long-
term response or sustainment of the logistics framework. The differing nature of the cases 
allowed for more in-depth analysis and understanding of how the USCG responds to both 
national and international disasters. Our analysis focused on the hard and soft asset 
capabilities the Coast Guard utilized in response efforts and capabilities uniquely provided 
by the service compared to the DoD and other response organizations. 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Our research began with an exhaustive literature review of previous academic 
research, articles, doctrine, and publications in the field of humanitarian response to better 
understand the nature of HA/DR and its relationship to federal agency and DoD response 
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operations. Information and data related to the two disasters include USCG after-action 
reports; interviews; financial data; DoD and private academic research papers and journals; 
federal, state, and county agency response summaries; reports and training documents; 
news sources; and other response organization documents. The objective of this research 
is to analyze the USCG’s effectiveness in its response to these two distinctly different 
disasters, draw comparisons in core capabilities and competencies provided by the service, 
identify best practices for asset allocation and response frameworks, and determine the 
strengths that the USCG contributes to the HA/DR response architecture. Our research 
seeks to identify the best utilization of the USCG during disaster events, especially given 
its role as both military service and a federal response agency.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
A limitation of this project rests with the exclusion of data delineating when hard 
and soft assets are deployed and the duration of deployments. Information and data 
concerning the USCG’s response efforts are dispersed and disaggregated, making it 
difficult, given the time constraints of this research, to locate and consolidate. The inclusion 
of this information potentially adds value to this research by allowing further analysis of 
the number and duration of deployed assets in order to determine appropriate resource 
employment.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to understand how the USCG responds to HA/DR operations, it was first 
necessary to gain a solid understanding of what HA/DR truly means. In the following 
section, we define, classify, and identify the phases of disasters. We then research the 
essential needs and capabilities of HA/DR and study what core capabilities response 
organizations offer. Next, we research the response framework of the nation, both 
domestically and internationally. Finally, we had to understand how the Coast Guard fits 
into those response frameworks and how the doctrine and policy guides their response.  
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1. Disasters Defined 
In order to analyze the Coast Guard’s response to disaster relief operations, we must 
first define the term disaster. The Joint Publication 3-29 defines a disaster as “a calamitous 
situation or event that occurs naturally or through human activities, which threatens or 
inflicts human suffering on a scale that may warrant emergency relief assistance from the 
United States Government or foreign partners.” (2019, p. I-4). Finally, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states that a disaster is “an occurrence of a 
natural catastrophe, technological accident, or a human-caused event that has resulted in 
severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple injuries” (FEMA, 1996, p. GLO-2). Our 
research shows there is a myriad of ways to define disaster, and that the definition depends 
on the organizational view of the term. 
2. Disaster Classification 
With the ambiguous definition of a disaster, it is even more critical to understand 
how disasters are classified. Historically, disasters are classified as either natural or man-
made. The two classifications are very intuitive, but they do not help us understand how to 
respond to a disaster. For example, the response to the man-made Deepwater Horizon 
disaster can differ significantly from a domestic response to a hurricane.  
Through his research in humanitarian logistics, Van Wassenhove (2006) classified 
disasters as “comprising of both slow-onset disasters such as droughts and famine, and 
sudden-onset disasters such as tsunamis and earthquakes” (p. 476). Slow- and sudden-onset 
disasters can still be classified as natural versus man-made. Figure 2 illustrates this concept.  
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Figure 2. Explaining Disasters. Source: Van Wassenhove (2006). 
Apte (2009) further refined the framework used by Van Wassenhove by adding 
location, either dispersed or localized, as well as the sudden- or slow-onset, as a 
consideration to explain the complexities of responding to a disaster. Apte (2009) described 
how disasters occurring over a slower period provide more time for planning and 
preparation. On the other hand, sudden disasters are more challenging to respond to 
because the response is reactionary. Apte further explained that dispersed disasters are 
more difficult to respond to than localized due to the logistical challenges faced when 
distributing essential supplies. Figure 3 illustrates the different quadrants and the level of 
difficulty when responding to such disasters.  
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Figure 3. Classification of Disasters. Source: Apte (2009). 
3. Phases of Disaster 
Van Wassenhove (2006) broke down disaster response during humanitarian 
logistics into three different phases: disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster 
management. The author identified five key elements in the disaster preparedness phase: 
human resources, knowledge management, process management, resources, and 
community, and explained that “to be better prepared and therefore respond more 
effectively all five elements need to interconnect” (p. 482). The logistical supply weakens 
if one of those elements breaks down, essentially becoming a weak link in the chain. Van 
Wassenhove (2006) defined the disaster response phase by effective coordination and 
communication between response organizations. Each phase requires a different tactic in 
response.  
Apte (2009) also considered humanitarian logistics to occur in three different 
phases: the preparedness, response, and recovery phases. She described the phases as 
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follows: “Preparedness efforts before the disaster strikes, response immediately after the 
disaster strikes, and recovery in the post-disaster period” (p. 27). Her research emphasizes 
the strategic importance of the preparedness phase, particularly in the pre-positioning of 
essential supplies.  
Although Van Wassenhove (2006) and Apte (2009) focused on humanitarian 
logistics during those studies, their research was utilized to understand better how the 
military and other government agencies could better respond to HA/DR. Apte and Yoho 
(2012) took the research further and explored the core capabilities of the U.S. military and 
non-military organizations in relation to the disaster response life cycle.  
4. Capabilities and Core Competencies 
Apte and Yoho (2012) stated that the ability of organizations to respond more 
efficiently to disaster operations depends on “their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit 
their core capabilities” (p. 5). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) said that there are three tests 
required to identify “core” competencies for a business firm: “The capability must not be 
easy for competitors to imitate, it must be able to be leveraged across a wide variety of 
products or markets, and it must contribute to the needs of the final customer or end-user.”  
Apte and Yoho (2012) refined these rules and created three criteria to identify core 
competencies for organizations providing HA/DR. Their three rules are as follows: “The 
capability should be unique or not matched by other organizations ... provide potential 
relief to a wide variety of disasters ... should make a substantial contribution toward the 
end relief received by the affected population” (p. 5). See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Humanitarian and Disaster Response Core Competencies. Source: 
Apte & Yoho (2012). 
11 
Apte and Yoho used these criteria to identify specific types of competencies 
“typically found in military and non-military organizations (NMO)” (2012, p. 6). An 
example is the USCG’s ability to provide search and rescue efforts by utilizing its rotor-
wing aircraft and cutter fleet. Apte and Yoho (2012) stated that war and disaster response 
share common characteristics, and therefore, military and humanitarian organizations can 
share capabilities. Apte and Yoho (2012) described six activities that are key to providing 
aid during disaster relief operation: “Information and knowledge management, needs 
assessment, supply, deployment and distribution, health service support, and collaboration 
and governance” (p. 7). Figure 5 illustrates this topic.  
 
Figure 5. Essential Services and Capabilities of Disaster Response. Source: 
Apte & Yoho (2012). 
Apte and Yoho (2012) provide a detailed description of the six essential services 
and capabilities of disaster response. The first is information and knowledge management. 
“Information management enables an organization to determine the ‘who, what, when, 
where, and how’ of a disaster” (p. 8). The answers provided to those questions help develop 
an understanding of the effects of the disaster. Once that understanding begins to take 
shape, the development of plans can begin to respond effectively. Apte and Yoho (2012) 
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stated that both military and NGOs rely primarily on news sources, government releases of 
information, and contacts on the ground. The military has unique capabilities that allow for 
aerial and satellite reconnaissance that may allow a different source of imagery of the 
disaster. Knowledge management is the ability to gather information and convert it into 
something that can be useful to an organization. Apte and Yoho (2012) mentioned that 
knowledge management can also be lessons learned from previous events. The military can 
provide after-action reports that can be utilized to learn and better respond to future HA/DR 
missions.  
The needs assessment is the second essential capability. Apte and Yoho (2012) 
acknowledged that the military and NGOs may view and identify needs differently. The 
military’s needs assessment involves the gathering of source intelligence to generate 
situational awareness and then determine what capabilities are required to complete the 
specific mission sets. An NGO’s needs assessment is completed to determine the size of 
the affected population, aid requirements, and logistics to support relief operations (Apte 
& Yoho, 2012). In both scenarios, the needs assessment provides information that allows 
the response supply chains to operate efficiently.  
The third essential capability that Apte and Yoho (2012) identified is supply. Apte 
and Yoho (2012) state that the "supply capability includes procurement, staging, 
warehousing, and inventory management" (p. 11). For organizations within the response 
effort, supply is merely being able to meet a specific demand created by the disaster. An 
effective response requires a good understanding of the logistical supply chain and ways 
to manage that inventory, from the source to the distribution of supply to the affected 
population. The complexity of disaster response makes this essential capability challenging 
to manage. The inability to forecast demand from sudden-onset disasters makes planning 
and pre-positioning of supply difficult. In addition to inventory management, NGOs must 
also manage donated supplies (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Apte and Yoho said that “donated 
supplies are as much a blessing as a curse” (p. 11). The donated supplies can disrupt the 
response supply chain and make the response effort more complex.  
Deployment and distribution comprise the fourth essential capability Apte and 
Yoho (2012) identified during disaster response. The military’s ability to respond quickly 
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to disasters with assets like fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, amphibious ships, heavy 
equipment, and motorized-vehicles allows for the flexibility and urgency needed during 
HA/DR. Apte and Yoho pointed out that “NGOs that respond to disasters are typically 
dependent on contracted or regularly scheduled commercial flights to move staff and 
supplies” (2012, p. 12). 
The fifth essential capability shown in Figure 5 is health services support. Apte and 
Yoho stated that “both the military and NMOs work toward the same objective when it 
comes to providing health services: relieving pain and suffering as well as preventing 
fatalities” (2012, p. 12). The military again has unique assets when it comes to this 
capability. Massive hospital ships like the USNS Comfort, which contains 12 fully 
equipped hospital rooms and a 1,000-bed hospital facility (U.S. Navy, 2019), are prime 
assets in the DoD’s efforts during HA/DR. The way the military operates allows them to 
administer and manage health services quickly.  
The final essential capability is collaboration and governance. Apte and Yoho 
(2012) defined collaboration as “a process in which two or more organizations work 
together to achieve a common goal” (p. 13). They described governance as “being achieved 
through command and control, or pre-established logistics networks and supply chains” (p. 
13). The chaos created from a disaster requires flexible supply chains. Collaboration and 
governance are critical in order to be flexible. Natural disasters are much like combat. 
“Friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, and danger are essential features” in war (U.S. 
Marine Corps, p. 19, 1997). One could argue that all those essential features can apply to 
disaster response as well, and that collaboration and governance are critically important to 
overcome those features. Apte and Yoho (2012) utilized the three rules identifying core 
capabilities to match both U.S. military and NGOs’ capabilities to the six essential services 




This figure was adapted by Apte and Yoho (2012) from Joint Publication 4–0 (DoD, 2008). 
Figure 6. Humanitarian and Core Competencies. Source: Apte & Yoho 
(2012). 
5. Domestic Response Framework 
After gaining an understanding of how disasters are defined and classified, the 
research focused on how the nation responds both domestically and internationally. The 
response to both type of disasters share similar response demands; however, the 
organization, doctrine, and policy differ significantly between national and international 
responses.  
a. Stafford Act 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, 
Public Law 100-107, grants the federal government the legal authority to provide 
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assistance, when formally requested, to states following a disaster event (Association of 
State and Territorial Health Officials, 2019). Under the Stafford Act, FEMA provides 
oversight and the management of disaster relief resources and support to states requesting 
assistance (Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 2019). The Stafford Act 
authorizes the president to declare a “major disaster” or “emergency” following the 
incident (Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, 2019). The Act is the legal 
authority to access funds appropriated by Congress.  
b. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created on April 1, 
1979. “FEMA coordinates the federal government’s role in preparing for, preventing, 
mitigating the effect of, responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether 
natural or man-made, including acts of terror” (FEMA, 2019, “History”). The terrorist 
events on September 11, 2001, brought about an entirely new perspective on crisis 
management, and with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS; Apte & Heath, 2011). On March 1, 2003, FEMA 
joined 22 other federal agencies and became a part of DHS (FEMA, 2019). The structure 
of FEMA would shift once again after Hurricane Katrina. President George W. Bush signed 
into law the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, and FEMA 
became the primary agency responsible for coordinating all types of domestic disaster 
response activities (Apte & Heath, 2011).  
c. National Response Framework 
The two primary guidance documents created by DHS for national disaster 
response are the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS; Apte & Heath, 2011). The NRF is built on “scalable, flexible, 
and adaptable concepts identified in NIMS to align key roles and responsibilities” (DHS, 
2016, p. i). To further explain, the NRF unifies strategic goals across five preparedness 
mission areas: “prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery” (DHS, 2016, p. 
12). The NRF establishes the doctrine and policy for response organizations during disaster 
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relief efforts (DHS, 2016). The NRF is a doctrine for managing any various disasters 
regardless of scale, scope, and complexity. 
The NRF is composed of a base document, Emergency Support Function (ESF) 
Annexes, and Support Annexes (DHS, 2016). The ESF Annexes categorizes assets and 
capabilities into the common resource requirements of a disaster. The appendix breaks 
down each ESF into detail. It is important to note that ESFs are merely a guide and do not 
attribute the responsibilities of one organization, nor do they provide legal authority for an 
agency to execute a function. ESFs are a way to effectively group and administer resources 
to distribute core capabilities (DHS, 2016).  
The NRF Support Annexes describe “the essential supporting processes and 
considerations that are most common to the majority of incidents” (DHS, 2016, p. 2). 
Within the Support Annexes are the operational structures used for coordination on the 
local, state, and federal levels. Emergency responders at all levels of government utilize 
the incident command system (ICS) to oversee disaster response. “ICS is a management 
system designed to integrate facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 
communications within a typical organizational structure” (DHS, 2016, p. 39). The 
integration at the local level occurs at the incident command post (ICP) and incorporates 
real-time command and control. The incident commander (IC) determines the resources 
and capabilities required for proper disaster response. The IC coordinates with the local 
emergency operation centers (EOC) to manage assets and resources. The EOCs facilitate 
multiagency coordination (DHS, 2016). NGOs, NMOs, and volunteer agencies often 
maintain their similar structures at the local levels. 
State operation structures mirror those at the local level. “State EOCs are activated 
as necessary to support local EOCs and ensure responders have the resources required” 
(DHS, 2016, p. 40). Local and state ICPs will continue coordinating with the EOCs to 
manage assets and resources. Figure 7 illustrates the state and local response structures.  
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Figure 7. State and Local Response Structure. Source: DHS (2016). 
Federal operational structures are more complex and are broken down into incident, 
regional, and headquarters levels. For our research, we focus more on regional and 
headquarter levels. FEMA has 10 different Regional Response Coordination Centers 
(RRCC; DHS, 2016). The NRF states that “when activated, RRCCs are multiagency 
coordination centers generally staffed by ESFs during preparation or immediately 
following an incident” (DHS, 2016, p. 44). RRCCs coordinate efforts between FEMA, 
state EOCs, and any other coordination centers established. 
Federal operations centers at the national level are activated when incidents expand 
beyond regional responsibilities or large geographic areas (DHS, 2016). In the event of a 
natural disaster, the National Operations Center (NOC) is the primary hub for coordinating 
disaster response. The NOC collects and integrates information from all subordinate 
operation centers (DHS, 2016). Much like the RRCC, when the National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC) is activated, it is a multiagency effort but resides at FEMA 
headquarters. As a functional component of the NOC, the NRCC supervises the response 
for disaster events and emergencies (DHS, 2016).  
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d. National Incident Management System 
The NIMS is the second source document that was created by DHS to establish 
procedures for federal disaster response. NIMS is a “comprehensive approach to a joint, 
interoperable approach to sharing resources, coordinating and managing incidents, and 
communicating information” (DHS, 2017, p. 1). Like the NRF, NIMS is the guiding 
framework for response organizations to “prevent, mitigate, and response to, and recover 
from incidence” (DHS, 2017, p. 1). The NIMS is designed to provide a shared vocabulary 
and processes to deliver capabilities. 
NIMS is divided into three parts: resource management, command and 
coordination, and communications and information management (DHS, 2017). The 
resource management component consists of “identifying and typing resources; qualifying, 
certifying, and credentialing personnel; planning for resources; and acquiring, storing, and 
inventorying resources” (DHS, 2017, p. 6). The objective of this section in the NIMS is to 
pool the different response agencies’ resources and encourage an overall fluid response. 
This section is vitally essential for the efficacy of managing resources. Our research, 
however, focuses more on section two of the NIMS.  
The second component is command and coordination. The incident management 
framework facilitates the synergy of all resources, assets, and personnel from multiple 
agencies (DHS, 2017). Incident command integration consists of four components: tactical 
activities, incident support coordination, policy guidance, and communications with the 
media and the public (DHS, 2017). Four functional groups within the NIMS coordinate the 
aforementioned areas of responsibility. These include the ICS, EOCs, multi-agency 
coordination (MAC) groups, and joint information systems (JIS). These four functional 
groups allow for the maximization of efforts across the entire spectrum of the response 
effort. The USCG utilizes the ICS throughout its doctrine; therefore, our research needed 
to expand on that functional group. 
The NIMS manual (DHS, 2017) defines the ICS as “a standardized approach to the 
command, control, and coordination of on-scene incident management that provides a 
common hierarchy within which personnel from multiple organizations can be effective” 
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(p. 24). The process is governed by either an Incident Commander (IC) or a Unified 
Commander. Each command is broken down into five responsibilities: command, 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration (DHS, 2017). Figure 8 
illustrates the command structure for a single IC. Although the unified command is more 
complicated than a single IC, it mirrors the same structure. The General Staff are 
responsible for the five major functional areas within the response effort. The IC or Unified 
Commander will activate the staff chiefs as needed, allowing for the flexibility required for 
all types of disaster situations.  
 
Figure 8. ICS Organization with a Single Incident Command. Source: 
National Incident Management (2017). 
The next step within the command and coordination section is to establish facilities 
surrounding the incident area to support response operations (DHS, 2017). Common types 
of ICS facilities include ICP staging areas, incident bases, and camps (DHS, 2017). Each 
facility adapts and fluctuates with the needs required from the disaster response.  
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The incident management team (IMT) develops simultaneously with the 
establishment of the facility. The IMT consists of ICS-qualified personnel to include the 
IC, staff members, and other vital positions (DHS, 2017). IMTs exist at all levels of the 
response organization. The IMTs are created to support the disaster response no matter the 
complexity. This may mean that there are several different IMTs through all levels of 
response working underneath the confines of the Unified Command. Another important 
personnel factor within the ICS is EOCs. 
We discussed EOCs in the explanation of the NRF, but it is important to reiterate 
that EOCs facilitate interagency staff coordination. EOCs exist at every level within the 
overall response effort. Each agency may have a different style of EOC, but all EOCs are 
structured similarly and are essential for information and knowledge management. Most 
government organizations arrange the EOC according to the ICS structure (DHS, 2017). 
The EOCs and IMTs are the on-site coordinators, while MAC groups are the off-site 
coordinators of the NIMS.  
MAC groups are responsible for the prioritization and allocations of incident 
response resources (DHS, 2017). The most important concept to understand about MAC 
groups is how they are composed. MACs do not perform incident command functions, so 
agencies from all spectrums of disaster response must represent its needs and requirements. 
The MAC is comprised of all higher-ranking officials in the supporting agencies and is 
referred to as the policy group (DHS, 2017).  
Another portion of the ICS is the JIS. The JIS is a system responsible for the 
“dissemination of timely, accurate, accessible, and actionable information to the public at 
all phases of incident management” (DHS, 2017, p. 42). An essential component of the JIS 
is the establishment of the joint information center (JIC). The JIC houses JIS operations 
and provides consistent dissemination of messages, preventing the release of inaccurate 
information (DHS, 2017).   
The third component of the NIMS is communications and information 
management. The concept of this component is that incident personnel depend on adaptive 
communication and information systems to collect accurate, timely, and relevant 
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information (DHS, 2017). Four fundamental principles allow for a consistent stream of 
information: “(1) interoperability; (2) reliability, scalability, and portability; (3) resilience 
and redundancy; and (4) security” (DHS, 2017, p. 50). The third component of the NIMS 
provides a guideline on how the multitude of agencies share information in regards to 
communications management, incident information, and standards and formats. The goal 
is to ensure there is a universal language among the response organizations to maximize 
overall response efforts. 
6. International Response Framework 
After gaining an understanding of how the United States responds to domestic 
disasters, it is important to understand how the United States responded internationally. 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was established by President 
John F. Kennedy on November 3, 1961, with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (USAID, 2019). Shortly after, the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID/OFDA) was created. USAID/OFDA, often time shortened to OFDA, was 
established to oversee the U.S. government’s international disaster response (USAID, n.d.). 
OFDA currently has warehouses strategically placed in Florida, Italy, and Dubai stocked 
with essential relief supplies like blankets, hygiene kits, and water treatment systems 
(USAID, n.d.). It is important to note that the responsibilities for international disaster 
response rests with the Department of State (DoS), and subsequently USAID, whereas the 
lead agency for domestic response is DHS and FEMA.  
Prior to a response by U.S. government entities, the affected nation’s government 
must formally request assistance from the United States. The president of the United States 
designates the primary response agency as USAID, which identifies, requests, and assigns 
the appropriate resources dependent on the nature of the disaster (USAID, n.d.). In most 
cases, USAID/OFDA does not have a breadth of organic resources to leverage to large-
scale responses and therefore acts as a coordinator of such resources.  
In order to determine the humanitarian requirement of the affected nation, OFDA 
dispatches regional and technical experts (USAID, n.d.). In response to large-scale 
disasters, OFDA deploys a disaster assistance response team (DART) to organize the U.S. 
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government (USG) response, while working with the host nation officials (USAID, n.d.). 
OFDA’s approach to foreign disaster response is that nations and local governments must 
respond to disasters themselves and attempt to strengthen their response through training 
and collaboration (USAID, n.d.). If required, USAID utilizes its authority to provide the 
capabilities and capacities of USG departments and agencies and help coordinate efforts 
through international agencies (Weisenfield, 2011). 
Coppola (2007) stated that OFDA prides itself on being “nonpolitical” and 
responds to all victim’s needs. OFDA is a much smaller agency than FEMA and responds 
differently. FEMA’s domestic response is often political, but it does not equate to the 
political complexity that OFDA faces during international disaster response. Coppola 
(2007) stated that international response to disasters is convoluted, at times chaotic, and 
always complicated. HA/DR differs with every disaster and the host nations in which the 
United States is providing support. As a result, OFDA does not follow the same guidelines 
as FEMA. The overall goal is to provide the requested support necessary by the host nation.  
7. United States Coast Guard HA/DR Operations 
Now that the method for U.S. response to domestic and international disasters is 
understood, it is important to distinguish the Coast Guard’s doctrine and policy guiding the 
organization during response efforts. Furthermore, it is crucial to delineate any differences 
between the Coast Guard and the DoD during HA/DR operations. 
According to Coast Guard (2014a), a crisis is defined as a “high-impact, complex 
incident that requires an extensive, well-coordinated multiagency and/or multinational, 
whole community response to save lives, minimize damage, protect the environment, and 
provide the basis for recovery” (p. 5). The doctrine also recognizes that a crisis event 
attracts public and political interest, which adds additional external influences and 
complicates an already complicated situation (USCG, 2014a).  
CG 3–28 (USCG, 2014a) states that NIMS and NRF are the two supporting 
documents that provide a comprehensive and integrated approach to domestic response. 
Intuitively, FEMA and the USCG operate similarly, as both organizations are a part of the 
DHS. The Coast Guard, in support of the ICS, maintains its own Coast Guard incident 
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management handbook. U.S. Coast Guard Incident Management Handbook (Commandant 
Publication P3120.17B) is a reference document for Coast Guard personnel in the 
execution of the NIMS’s ICS framework (USCG, 2014b). The checklist helps establish the 
USCG’s IC, IMTs, and the incident action plan. It is a guideline that explains roles and 
responsibilities, multiagency coordination under NRF, SAR (search and rescue) 
operations, oil spills, and hazardous substance response (USCG, 2014b).  
Internationally the Coast Guard’s assistance is coordinated through the 
USAID/OFDA. CG Pub 3–28 (USCG, 2014a, p. 10) states that “the Coast Guard will 
integrate its response efforts with the overall response organization, provide support 
through DoD HA/DR missions, and may engage under its authorities” (2014, p. 10). A 
memorandum of understanding between the USCG and USAID states that the USCG may 
provide goods and services requested by USAID/OFDA in support of disaster relief, 
provide technical assistance, deploy resources, and participate in training exercises (DHS, 
2011).  
The internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) that guide the USCG’s response 
to HA/DR are the Coast Guard Atlantic Area Contingency Plan 9700 (COMLANTAREA 
OPLAN 9700), and the Coast Guard Pacific Area Contingency Plan 9800 
(COMPACAREA OPLAN 9800). The purpose of the plans is to provide procedures, 
policy, and response structure to conduct Coast Guard operations as part of coordinated 
national crisis response to civil and military contingencies that have an international, 
national, regional, or localized impact (USCG, 2007). Both the OPLAN 9700 and OPLAN 
9800 align with the policies and procedures outlined in the NRF and NIMS.  
The difference in HA/DR response between the DoD and the USCG is that the 
USCG operates under Title 14 of the U.S. Code, whereas the DoD operates under Title 10. 
The USCG has 11 statutory missions under Title 14: search and rescue; marine safety; 
ports, waterways, and coastal security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense 
readiness; ice operations; aids to navigation and waterways management; marine 
environmental protection; living marine resources; and other law enforcement (USCG, 
2012). These statutory missions allow for the flexibility required to respond quickly to 
disaster relief efforts. 
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The critical thing to note is that DoD regulations and programs like the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) do not apply to the Coast Guard. The DoD is limited 
legally under Title 10 and prohibits the use of military personnel in enforcing civil law. 




III. CASE STUDIES 
The sections that follow provide a synopsis of the USCG’s involvement in both a 
national and international disaster. The two cases provide overall background of the 
disasters, and the contributions of the USCG. The information in this chapter facilitates the 
analysis completed in Chapter IV.  
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE 
At 16:53 on January 12, 2010, an intense earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter 
scale struck Haiti in a region 25 kilometers southwest of the populated Haitian capital of 
Port-au-Prince (see Figure 9). This event was the most devastating natural disaster to hit 
the Caribbean nation in recorded history. The earthquake resulted in the deaths of 316,000 
people, injured 300,000, collapsed 100,000 structures, and displaced more than one million 
persons (Cecchine et al., 2013). The earthquake destroyed the capital and the surrounding 
regions, effectively crippling the country’s infrastructure and the Haitian government, and 
destroyed the country’s only major seaport (Brown, 2010). The Haitian president, with 
concurrence from the U.S. ambassador to Haiti, declared a national emergency and 
formally requested assistance from the U.S. government (DiOrio, 2010).  
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Figure 9. Damage Incurred by Haiti Earthquake. Source: Pallardy (n.d.). 
President Barack Obama released a statement that day saying,  
At this moment, we are moving forward with one of the largest relief efforts 
in our history ... to save lives and deliver relief that averts an even larger 
catastrophe. ... We stand united with the people of Haiti, who have shown 
such incredible resilience, and we will help them to recover and rebuild. 
(White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2010) 
Obama directed a response led by USAID with significant support from the DoD 
via U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM; Cecchine et al., 2013). Additionally, the DHS 
established the Haiti Incident Response Team (DHS-HIRT), and FEMA activated an 
NRCC in Florida (Cecchine et al., 2013). 
Within hours of the earthquake, the Seventh Coast Guard District in Miami, FL, 
activated its IMT (Brown, 2010) and stood-up an ICP to coordinate the initial recovery and 
assistance operations with the DoS, USAID, FEMA IMT, DoD, and Haitian government 
officials (Brown, 2010). Already deployed to the region, the CGCs Forward and Mohawk 
diverted from their current missions to respond. Arriving within 17 hours of the disaster on 
the morning of January 13, the CGC Forward provided some of the first images of the 
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disaster, initial damage assessments, and emergency medical evacuation of critically 
injured (Brown, 2010). Additionally, the crew of CGC Forward provided basic air-
deconfliction for the inoperable control tower at Toussaint Louverture International Airport 
(Coast Guard Aviation Association, n.d.). The crew of the Forward teamed with Haitian 
Coast Guard members in Killick to establish an ad hoc medical treatment facility. On the 
afternoon of January 13, the CGC Mohawk arrived on scene and assisted with initial relief 
efforts. By this time, there were three USCG MH-65s and one MH-60 conducting damage 
assessment and aeromedical evacuations to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Additionally, two 
USCG HC-130s arrived with the ability to transport up to 140 personnel to Santo Domingo, 
Dominican Republic, while two additional HC-130s were prepositioned to Air Station 
Miami to support airlift operations (Coast Guard Aviation Association, n.d.). 
On January 14, SOUTHCOM established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) to 
coordinate U.S. military assets for Operation Unified Response. A portion of Coast Guard 
assets, including cutters and the Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit 
(MTSRU), fell under the tactical control (TACON) of JTF-Haiti while remaining assets 
remained under DHS-HIRT. That same day, both the CGC Tahoma and CGC Valiant 
arrived on the scene with critical relief supplies. The Tahoma’s medical corpsman and 
medically trained personnel augmented the Haitian Coast Guard clinic in Killick and 
provided urgent care to the critically wounded. By the end of the day, the clinic transitioned 
to a USCG-led operation (Brown, 2010). Throughout its deployment, the CGC Tahoma 
served as a platform for aeromedical evacuations aboard USCG and Navy rotary wing 
assets. 
Throughout the next few days, a large contingent of DoD assets to include ships, 
rotary, and fixed-winged aircraft arrived to provide significant capacity to the relief effort. 
However, one of the limiting factors to the response supply chain was the condition of and 
access to port facilities. The CGC Oak, an ocean-going buoy tender, and an attached U.S. 
Coast Guard Atlantic Area (LANTAREA) MTSRU arrived on January 18. The MTSRU’s 
role consisted of the completion of a port assessment and to re-establish the flow of cargo 
into Haiti ports. The team was assigned to CTF-42, commonly referred to as the JTF Port 
Opening Team, and based their operations on the CGC Oak (LANTAREA, 2011). In 
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addition to the delivery of medical supplies, food, water, and support of the MTSRU, the 
CGC Oak’s main objective was to assess the port. The Oak completed surveys, repairs, and 
placement of navigational aids, ultimately establishing safe navigational routes for relief 
vessels. On January 21, the port was open to limited vessel traffic (Braesch, 2010) and was 
30% operational (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). Shortly after, USCG 
Port Security Unit 307 arrived to provide port security operations and to facilitate the 
distribution of aid supplies as USCG and Navy continued to work toward restoring port 
operations (Lagan, 2010) 
The MTSRU played a pivotal role in the re-establishment of port operations to 
facilitate the impending response supply chain. The MTSRU conducted channel surveys, 
pier construction assessments, pier dimensions and suitability evaluations, and fuel 
terminal facility assessment. They conducted daily meetings with key partners to deconflict 
port priorities, deconflict vessel arrivals, and foster coordination among critical participants 
of the logistics response effort. The MTSRU contributed significantly to the increase in 
cargo throughput of the port as the humanitarian response increased. 
On January 23, the government of Haiti declared an end to search-and-rescue 
operations, and USAID began its transition from initial response to a relief phase (Guha-
Sapir et al, 2011). By January 31, JTF-Haiti consisted of more than 22,200 personnel, 33 
Navy and USCG vessels, and 300 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. By February 5, JTF-Haiti 
transitioned from their defined response phase to relief operations, which initiated a gradual 
decrease in personnel and assets supporting the effort, as depicted in Figure 10 (Cecchine 
et al., 2013). 
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Figure 10. JTF Personnel Strength over Time. Source: Cecchine et al. (2013). 
The USCG’s initial aviation response included a total of 12 aircraft assets in direct 
support of relief operations: five HC-130s, one HC-144A, three MH-65s, and three MH-
60s (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2010). Throughout the response, these 
aircraft moved 1.1 million pounds of cargo, evacuated 1,150 American citizens, performed 
240 medical evacuations, and delivered more than 715 first responders. Although the initial 
response phase consisted of six USCG cutters, the overall effort comprised 35 major cutters 
and 19 patrol boats (Brown, 2010). 
B. HURRICANE HARVEY 
On August 12, 2017, Hurricane Harvey began as a tropical wave off the west coast 
of Africa, although it grew to a tropical storm as it passed Barbados on August 18. As the 
storm proceeded westward toward the Yucatan Peninsula, increasing northerly wind shear 
weakened the storm to a depression (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018). As the storm entered the 
warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, the poorly organized storm rapidly intensified. Late in 
the day on August 24, the storm became a Category 1 hurricane (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018), 
prompting the first hurricane warnings in Texas (Ho & Davis, 2018). On August 25, 
Hurricane Harvey approached the Texas coast as a Category 3 storm and made its first 
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landfall near Rockport, TX, as a Category 4 hurricane (Huber, Klinger, & O’Hara, 2018). 
It made its second landfall hours later near Holiday Beach. Sustained winds reached 115 
knots. The hurricane caused significant wind and surge damage and was the first Category 
4 hurricane to directly impact the United States since 2004 (LANTAREA, 2017). The 
storm remained relatively stationary over the Houston area, and from August 26 to August 
27, it slowly reversed course toward the Gulf of Mexico and inundated the Houston and 
Beaumont areas with torrential rains. The storm’s movement slowed to nearly 5 mph and 
stalled over southeastern Texas for four days (Amadeo, 2019). 
As Harvey stagnated over Harris County, the storm inundated the Houston area 
with historic rainfalls. Harvey was later recorded as “the most significant tropical cyclone 
rainfall event in United States history” (Blake & Zelinsky, 2018, p. 6). The storm dumped 
nearly 27 trillion gallons of rain over Texas (Huber, Klinger, & O’Hara, 2018). Areas such 
as Nederland, TX, received 60.5 inches, which is a record for a single storm in U.S. history 
(Amadeo, 2019). Jeff Lindner, a Flood Control District meteorologist, reported that a foot 
and a half of water covered 70% of Harris County (Amadeo, 2019).  
Tropical Storm Harvey continued to flood southeastern Texas as it moved east 
along the Gulf of Mexico. It made its third and final landfall in Louisiana on August 30 
(Ho & Davis, 2018). In the aftermath, the financial impact of Hurricane Harvey totaled an 
estimated $125 billion in damage, establishing it as the second-most costly storm to impact 
the United States since 1900 (Huber, Klinger, & O’Hara, 2018). Harvey was responsible 
for 68 direct deaths and roughly 35 additional deaths from indirect causes (Blake & 
Zelinsky, 2018). The storm affected 13 million people and damaged approximately 




Figure 11. Hurricane Harvey’s Path. Source: McCollum (2017). 
Preparations for Harvey began on the morning of August 23, when the governor of 
Texas preemptively declared a state of disaster for 30 counties (Governor’s Commission 
to Rebuild Texas, 2018). On August 24, FEMA began pre-positioning supplies and 
personnel in Texas, establishing IMTs to the EOC in Austin, TX, in preparation for the 
inevitable recovery efforts (Governor’s Commission to Rebuild Texas, 2018). The USCG 
was also performing actions to prepare for the incoming storm. District 8, whose area of 
operation includes the Texas coastal zone, immediately began preparations by establishing 
an ICP (USCG, 2018b). LANTAREA began the request for forces (RFF) process, and 
USCG sectors from all over the United States, including Hawaii, Alaska, and even Guam, 
were put on standby for the response (LANTAREA, 2017).  
When Harvey made landfall, Coast Guard crews were the first federal responders 
to conduct rescue missions and damage assessments. The commander of District Eight, 
Rear Admiral Paul Thomas, stated:  
Even before the storm cleared Texas, our crews were on the water, working 
with partner agencies to restore critical channels and aids to navigation and 
to ensure the port facilities were able to safely receive ships and restore-
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start operations here in the Port of Houston and throughout Texas. (United 
States Congress Committee on Homeland Security, 2018, p. 11) 
The extensive flooding caused by Harvey created a large-scale, multi-agency SAR 
mission, not seen since Hurricane Katrina (LANTAREA, 2017). The Coast Guard is the 
primary agency to conduct Emergency Support Function #9 (ESF-9), which is the SAR 
annex to the NRF. The Coast Guard’s use of the Western River Flood Punt teams proved 
pivotal during these operations (LANTAREA, 2017). These six-person teams and their 16-
foot punt boats conducted countless SAR and recovery operations throughout Harvey’s 
response effort. 
The Coast Guard was not just providing SAR on the waters, but numerous rotary-
wing assets were in the air providing SAR and casualty evacuation as well. HC-144s, HC-
130s, MH-60s, and MH-65s were working hand in hand with multiple agencies—including 
FEMA, local agencies and the DoD—to provide support for the victims of Harvey. Samuel 
Knoeppel, an Air Station Miami rescue swimmer, stated that “every house you looked at 
had multiple people on a roof. It was crazy to see how many helicopters were next to you 
while you were hoisting” (Collins, 2018).  
During the response effort, FEMA assigned the USCG 12 different mission 
assignments (MA), including ESF-1, ESF-9, and ESF-10. Overall, 2,060 active duty, 
reservists, and auxiliary personnel responded. The assistance effort included 50 rotary-
wing and fixed-wing aircraft, 75 shallow-water boats, and 29 cutters (LANTAREA, 2017). 
The Coast Guard rescued over 11,022 people and 1,384 pets (FEMA, 2017). District 8 
alone conducted 7,587 SAR missions, corrected 197 Aids to Navigation (AToN) 
discrepancies, and responded to over 800 potential pollution incidents (USCG, 2018a). 
SAR operations completed on September 7, but the USCG, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), and other federal, state, and local partners continued to contend with further 




The following analysis utilizes the essential services and capabilities for disaster 
response and humanitarian and core competencies frameworks to characterize actions of 
the USCG. Using the information provided from the case studies, we identify defining 
capabilities the USCG employed during the relief efforts and how the response contributes 
to the demands of a disaster response. 
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE 
The following section applies Apte and Yoho’s (2012) six essential services and 
capabilities to the USCG’s response to the Haiti earthquake. 
1. Information and Knowledge Management 
Information and knowledge management are critical factors in determining the 
effects of a disaster and how the response effort supports the needs of the affected 
population. The Coast Guard’s arrival at Port-au-Prince within 17 hours of the disaster 
proved significant. The initial assessments and reporting of on-scene information, passed 
by CGC Forward to LANTAREA, was crucial in the USG response organization. 
Infrastructure assessments provided the first insights to the extent of the devastation 
(LANTAREA, 2011). Notably, the H-65 reconnoitered the road network leaving the port 
and provided vital information that supplies arriving at the port could be transported via 
truck to Port-au-Prince (Coast Guard Aviation Association, n.d.) Although the initial 
efforts did not provide a comprehensive assessment comparable to traditional damage 
assessment teams or humanitarian assistance survey teams, the CGC Forward’s crew 
delivered vital information to formulate an initial humanitarian response.  
The Coast Guard’s prepositioned country liaison officers (LNO) contributed to the 
effort through careful coordination between the DoD, DoS, and Haitian government 
officials (LANTAREA, 2011). The LNO’s local knowledge and contacts expedited the 
coordination of effort among a myriad of relief partners (LANTAREA, 2011). The Haitian 
communications network was in shambles, and as a result, the primary means of 
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communication for USCG assets and personnel was email. However, as relief operations 
progressed, the use of satellite phones and plain-text radio communication proved critical 
to conferring information and requirements and coordinating relief (LANTAREA, 2011).  
As the response effort expanded to include more response organizations, oversight 
of the operational picture became difficult. The various chains of command and the roles 
and responsibilities of liaisons and assigned personnel impeded the Coast Guard’s ability 
to collect real-time information (LANTAREA, 2011). Following the establishment of JTF-
Haiti, some Coast Guard assets fell under the tactical control of the DoD command, and 
differing priorities between organizations sometimes led to challenges in coordination and 
information sharing between partners (LANTAREA, 2011).  
Through information provided by the MTSRU, the Coast Guard’s Ship 
Coordination Center played an essential role in the dissemination of vessel management 
information and the visibility of supplies flowing into the port (LANTAREA, 2011). The 
daily report provided specific vessel information and sequencing of vessels, which enabled 
planners to coordinate strategic functions of the response supply chain. 
Early on in the effort, existing interagency and DoS liaison officers were not 
included as regular contacts and, in some cases, Coast Guard command centers were not 
aware of the liaison assignments (LANTAREA, 2011). The structure of the relief effort 
and an unfamiliarity with the roles of various organizations and the key players within them 
proved difficult to disperse and receive information (LANTAREA, 2012). USAID 
response management team (RMT) LNO often lacked visibility of Coast Guard resources 
and overall Coast Guard response effort, which limited their ability to provide timely and 
accurate information to USAID and interagency partners (LANTAREA, 2011). The 
difficulties faced by the Coast Guard during sudden-onset disasters such as Haiti, especially 
during the initial response phase, detracted from the organization’s effectiveness (Apte & 
Yoho, 2012).  
2. Needs Assessment 
The Coast Guard is a response organization whose capabilities and capacities limit 
its ability to perform a level of assessment and scale response assets compared to their DoD 
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counterparts. According to Apte and Yoho (2009), the military’s needs assessment involves 
the collection and amalgamation of source data to create a list of requirements and a 
matching set of capabilities to meet those requirements.  
The Coast Guard’s experience with international disasters is limited, and much of 
the needs analysis relies on its experience with national-level disasters. The assessment 
completed by the Coast Guard for the Haiti earthquake was predicated on their contingency 
planning process, completed on a regular basis, and facilitated their rapid response of assets 
without the use of formal assessment teams (U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 2011), such 
as the Marine Corps’ (USMC) humanitarian assistance survey team (Iturriaga & Gastrock, 
2013). Most Coast Guard assets are continually in operational status and, therefore, rapidly 
deploy to render assistance. The Coast Guard recognizes that its assets and personnel 
cannot deliver the scale of aid required of a disaster such as this, but it acknowledges it 
could capitalize on its ability to respond to the immediate needs of the disaster: rapid 
dissemination of information to support the response organization, emergency medical aid 
and medical evacuation, search and rescue, damage assessment, and the interim command 
and control of air and sea assets arriving ahead of the primary response effort.  
The first CGCs on-scene, the CGC Forward and Mohawk, served a small but 
impactful role in the broader response effort’s determination of the situation on the ground. 
The initial assessment and survey of the damage completed by the Coast Guard served to 
assist the response organization’s formulation of the required assets and aid. Compared to 
the approach of the DoD or of NGOs who first assess a disaster to determine the type and 
amount of aid or assets to be sent (Apte & Yoho, 2012), the Coast Guard relied upon 
assumptions of the initial needs to rapidly deploy assets and personnel. CGC Forward’s 
analysis of the condition of the port initiated the activation of the MTSRU to reconstitute 
the country’s only major port (LANTAREA, 2011). The Coast Guard’s assessment of the 
port’s critical role within the response supply chain facilitated a majority of the aid sent to 
the country via commercial, national government, and military sealift. Additionally, the 
CGC Forward crew’s relationship with the Haitian Coast Guard and others determined the 
emergent needs of the local populace until the augmenting response force’s arrival 
(LANTAREA, 2011). 
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The Coast Guard’s historical role in Haiti and experience of Haitian migration 
events led to the execution of the Operation Vigilant Sentry contingency plan 
(LANTAREA, 2012). This plan was created in 2003 by Homeland Security Task Force—
South East and served to stem a possible mass migration event, which could both 
jeopardize the security of the United States and result in lives lost at sea. Following the 
earthquake, the Coast Guard anticipated austere conditions that would trigger a mass 
migration. Although the migration event did not materialize, the Coast Guard deployed 
three cutters to the area in addition to those dedicated to JTF-Haiti. 
3. Supply 
The destruction of hospitals and the lack of adequate medical supplies created a 
desperate medical situation for tens of thousands of Haitians in dire need of critical medical 
care and supplies. Six field hospitals were eventually established in schools and sports 
stadiums, and the hospitals near the border in neighboring Dominican Republic quickly 
reached their capacity (DiOrio, 2010). The earthquake devastated the country’s 
infrastructure, debris blocked strategic access roads, and the country’s air and seaports 
were inoperable (DiOrio, 2010). The earthquake destroyed its already fragile power grid 
and communications networks, and already limited sources of fuel and water were now 
nonexistent (DiOrio, 2010). Fearing the effects of aftershocks, Haitians slept in the streets, 
shantytowns, or vehicles, which created a significant need for shelter. Without essential 
services and the arrival of sufficient quantities of aid, the country experienced desperation, 
chaos, and potential security threats to the response efforts.  
Historically, the Coast Guard cannot contend with the large-scale procurement, 
staging, warehousing, or inventory management of the DoD, NGOs, or the United Nations 
(Apte & Yoho, 2012). As the first U.S. ships on scene, Coast Guard cutters provided what 
food and medical supplies they could to meet the emergent needs of the population (Brown, 
2010). For the cutters diverted from operational missions elsewhere, relief supplies 
provided to the population consisted of onboard stock and those able to be procured at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Brown, 2010). Subsequent Coast Guard assets transported a 
variety of relief supplies; however, the service’s assets are not well suited to transport bulk 
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supplies, nor do they possess an efficient means of transferring goods ashore when port 
facilities do not exist. The Coast Guard recognized the importance of re-establishing port 
operations to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies. The distinctive capabilities the Coast 
Guard provided were its port assessment capabilities, management of port operations, and 
support to the Haitian Port Authority. As the only port capable of supporting the inflow of 
supplies needed for the relief operation, the Coast Guard’s deployment of the CGC Oak 
and its deployable MTSRU team to re-establish the seaport in Port-au-Prince was pivotal 
to the massive flow of relief supplies to come.  
Similar to other U.S. military ships, Coast Guard cutters have the ability to produce 
a supply of fresh water using on-board reverse osmosis (RO) equipment. Unfortunately, 
the majority of medium-endurance cutter assets deployed on scene suffered casualties with 
their RO pumps and were unable to supply supplemental water to the population (U.S. 
Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 2011).  
Security for responders and the local populace became a point of concern as reports 
of looting and violence began to surface (DiOrio, 2010). Response organizations faced 
potentially grave dangers and levels of uncertainty and instability as supplies began 
pouring in. As a maritime service, the Coast Guard assessed port security as an emerging 
requirement and postured Port Security Unit (PSU) 307 to assist. However, a security 
environment requiring PSU personnel did not materialize, and the personnel performed 
other related roles. 
4. Deployment and Distribution 
The military is relied upon for its unique abilities for transportation, strategic airlift, 
and deployment and distribution assets during disaster response (Apte & Yoho, 2012). The 
Coast Guard’s legacy missions do not necessitate the availability of or requirement for 
significant airlift and sealift assets, and as such, they do not provide a significant 
contribution to the deployment and distribution of aid or relief supplies.  
Coast Guard assets were best utilized by providing incremental capabilities to the 
unified military effort and coordinated one of the essential facets of the response supply 
chain: the management and coordination of port operations alongside the Haitian Port 
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Authority. The expertise provided with port operations facilitated the flow of almost 
200,000 barrels of oil, 3,000 pallets of supplies, 1,000 tons of medical supplies, and the 
processing of 2200 intermodal containers (LANTAREA, 2011). However, vessel traffic 
management posed a significant challenge early in the response effort. The decision 
authority was not well defined, and the scheduling of the arrival of commercial and foreign 
government vessels transporting relief supplies was slowed (U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic 
Area, 2011). The limitation appeared to indicate the challenges of a massive relief effort 
that struggled to establish an appropriate structure to effectively manage the inflow of 
supplies (U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 2011). 
The MTSRU’s role in re-establishing port operations proved vital to enabling the 
massive logistics flow of relief supplies to the area’s only operating port. Eighty-two 
organizations were involved in the response effort, and the ability of the MTSRU to 
contend with competing priorities, sequence vessel traffic, and coordinate the distribution 
of supplies to the appropriate entities strained the capacity of the team and their partners 
(LANTAREA, 2011). NGOs were not part of the Maritime Transportation System 
recovery plan, and therefore, difficulties ensued. Ships from various organizations, 
countries, and governments often arrived with little notice. The Coast Guard, with 
concurrence from Haitian authorities, established a 96-hour Advanced Notice of Arrival 
(ANA) system, which greatly improved vessel management to the port (LANTAREA, 
2011). The MTSRU performed exceptionally; however, it was often tasked beyond their 
normal mission scope and given the somewhat ambiguous structure of the response 
structure, it was unclear whom to defer tasking to (LANTAREA, 2011).  
Coast Guard fixed-wing assets primarily participated in the transport and flow of 
response personnel to support the response effort and the evacuation of American citizens 
stranded in the country. Within the first five days of the response effort, Coast Guard 
aircraft transported over 600 Urban SAR team members, a Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) Disaster Medical Assistance Team, and numerous personnel from 
FEMA, HHS, and the United Nations to support relief efforts on the ground (Coast Guard 
Aviation Association, n.d.).  
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Although U.S. military forces were present at the invitation of the Haitian 
government and the UN approved the role of the United States as the lead response 
organization, the diversity of governments, NGOs, and international agencies caused much 
disorganization during the early stages of relief operations (DiOrio, 2010). The lack of 
clarity in the organization of the various participants and the question of “who is in charge” 
appeared to hinder the distribution of humanitarian aid and the effective use of assets 
(LANTAREA, 2011).  
5. Health Service Support 
Within the first days following the earthquake, the medical situation became dire. 
The earthquake destroyed the medical facilities, and the few ad hoc aid stations were 
operating beyond capacity (DiOrio, 2010). Port-au-Prince’s morgues quickly became 
overwhelmed with thousands of bodies, and before mass graves were dug in an area north 
of the capital, bodies piled up in the streets (DiOrio, 2010). The sanitation and health 
conditions as a result of the disaster only worsened as time progressed. The goal of every 
organization responding to a disaster, including the military and NGOs, is to relieve the 
pain and suffering of the population and prevent the further loss of life (Apte & Yoho, 
2012). The Coast Guard does not possess significant health care response assets, though its 
arrival within hours of the earthquake was critical to providing interim care to a portion of 
the affected populace. 
The DoD and international relief effort lacked the capability to respond as rapidly 
as the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s initial response focused on the critical needs it 
could satisfy: immediate and basic medical care and triage, platforms to support the 
medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of critically wounded, the distribution of limited relief 
supplies, and the assessment of the port infrastructure. Albeit small in comparison to the 
combined relief efforts, the establishment of an ad-hoc medical facility and rendering of 
aid to the critically wounded demonstrated to Haitians the early signs of resolve of the U.S. 
government to assist the people of Haiti. Early on in the response, the Coast Guard’s effort 
served as a temporary “band-aid” to the needs of the affected population by establishing 
relationships and assisting the local government with its efforts to respond to the disaster 
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(LANTAREA, 2011). As relief operations continued and the DoD assumed the lead role 
for Operation Unified Response, a gap in coordination efforts between Coast Guard LNOs 
and other DoD components significantly limited the Coast Guard providing one of its 
pivotal competencies: MEDEVAC. DoD entities directed Coast Guard aircraft to conduct 
MEDEVAC operations; however, Coast Guard helicopters could not land aboard DoD 
platforms because of their exclusion from the DoD medical plan (LANTAREA, 2011). 
Coast Guard cutter corpsmen and emergency management technicians assisted the 
Haitian Coast Guard and members of the Sri Lankan Army assigned to the UN mission 
with emergency medical treatment of critically wounded persons. (Brown, 2010). The 
Coast Guard cutter’s crew was invaluable in establishing critical medical treatment and 
demonstrating the resolve of the U.S. government to support the affected population. 
USCG cutter and helicopter crews established a MEDEVAC route from the base in Killick 
to a hospital south of Cap Haitien, facilitating the treatment of numerous critically injured 
persons. CGCs on scene supported more than 100 flight deck operations performed by 
Coast Guard H-65, H-60, and Navy SH-60 aircraft (LANTAREA, 2011).  
Coast Guard assets are generally adept at basic emergency medical care and the 
medical transport of patients but do not have the advanced medical treatment capability or 
assets available that the DoD or some NGOs possess. Unless previously assigned to a 
mission that does not require a rescue swimmer (RS), all Coast Guard aircraft responding 
to a disaster or search and rescue operation contain an RS. The RS possesses a minimum 
qualification of Emergency Medical Technician–Basic and can provide medical care for 
MEDEVAC and medical transport operations. During the response to the earthquake, the 
standardized staffing of RSs aboard Coast Guard helicopters provided a flexible asset to 
the response effort. The standard crew enabled the assets to perform combined missions of 
damage assessment, SAR, and MEDEVAC and provided significant flexibility to the 
response organization. 
The airport served as the only means for medical supply distribution and several 
different organizations and countries arrived and set up independently operated and 
logistically sourced facilities near the airport (DiOrio, 2010). The presence of Coast Guard 
cutters and their ability to support flight deck operations for Coast Guard and Navy 
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helicopters provided a relatively safe means for evacuating critical patients to a higher level 
of care (LANTAREA, 2011). The cutter’s health service technicians at Killick performed 
vital triage of patients before transport to the USNS Comfort hospital ship. Initially, the 
joint-operations environment limited the performance and capability of Coast Guard assets. 
Until a Coast Guard LNO reported to the DoD Joint Task Force staff, confusion ensued as 
to which Coast Guard assets shifted under control of the Task Force and which were not 
(LANTAREA, 2011). As a result, coordination between the JTF and the Coast Guard led 
to lapses in communication and coordination. The USNS Comfort, or higher DoD medical 
authority, did not provide the U.S. Coast Guard, Canadian Air Force, or other NGO entities 
with a medical regulating plan process to manage the flow of operational medical tasking. 
This exclusion prohibited USCG and Canadian MEDEVAC assets from utilizing their non-
DoD MEDEVAC capable aircraft to assist in the MEDEVAC of patients to the USNS 
Comfort.  
6. Collaboration and Governance 
Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. The earthquake 
killed a significant portion of Haiti’s government leadership, and its ability to govern was 
virtually nonexistent. A core strength of the Coast Guard is its established relationships 
with key partners in disaster relief. The Coast Guard focused on core competencies it could 
offer to the relief effort. The Coast Guard’s interagency and international partnerships and 
historical role and experience in Haiti proved to be vital in leveraging partnerships with the 
Haitian government and participating agencies. Existing LNOs in Haiti streamlined the 
coordination between the services, the U.S. Embassy, and the Haitian government 
(LANTAREA, 2011). The LNO’s local knowledge and contacts allowed the Coast Guard 
and other agencies to expedite relief efforts in some areas; however, a somewhat unclear 
chain of command and ambiguities within the organizational structure hindered response 
efforts.  
The Coast Guard is not a significant contributor of physical logistics assets in the 
response supply chain; however, it worked within its fields of expertise to contribute to the 
overall logistics plan (LANTAREA, 2011). The importance of collaboration during the 
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response of a disaster such as the Haiti earthquake cannot be overstated (Waugh & Streib, 
2006). Airfields and seaports are a crucial ingredient to the structure of the humanitarian 
supply chain, and few agencies possess the necessary proficiency with re-establishing port 
operations. Haiti’s government and port system were nonfunctional, the port authority 
facilities were destroyed, and there was no recovery plan in place to re-establish operations 
(LANTAREA, 2011). The Coast Guard quickly built relationships among numerous 
organizational elements and recognized the importance of empowering the Haitian Port 
Authority, as the lead element was crucial to the port resuming operations (LANTAREA, 
2011). The adaptability of the Coast Guard in leveraging their experience with unifying a 
diverse set of partners, including the DoD, Haitian port authorities, USAID, World Food 
Program representatives, and salvage operators, ensured the sustainment of the logistics 
supply chain.  
Many of the challenges faced by the Coast Guard related to both internal and 
external factors. Despite the existence of LNOs, the complexity of the response and the 
myriad of organizations routinely limited effective utilization of assets. The Coast Guard’s 
visibility of LNOs assigned to the various agencies was lacking, and therefore, their ability 
to effectively coordinate and share information was limited (LANTAREA, 2011). Early 
on, the lack of organizational structure generated concern among Coast Guard players. 
According to the Coast Guard, “the dysfunctional organizational structure severely 
hindered the distribution of humanitarian aid in the first days of the operation” 
(LANTAREA, p. 4, 2011). As the response operation progressed, coordination improved 
among partners, but the overwhelming number of players proved challenging to synthesize. 
USAID recognized the lapses in protocols between the various groups to manage a “whole 
of government” response sufficiently and comprehensively (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011). For 
an organization with a relatively small role in the greater response effort and one 
accustomed to a well-formed domestic response framework, the difficulties with the lack 
of an established management framework by USAID and other organizations limited the 
effectiveness of the response (Guha-Sapir et al., 2011).  
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B. HURRICANE HARVEY 
The following section applies Apte and Yoho’s (2012) six essential services and 
capabilities to the USCG’s response to Hurricane Harvey. 
1. Information and Knowledge Management 
Information and knowledge management is essential to proper HA/DR response. 
The USCG and FEMA utilize the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which 
has a subcomponent called the Incident Command System (ICS). ICS is designed to help 
organize the amount of information that is disseminated when responding to a disaster 
(Buck, Trainor, & Aguirre, 2006). In conjunction with ICS, USCG operates the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) as a “system for trusted sharing of sensitive but 
unclassified information between federal, state, local, territorial, international, and private 
sectors partners” (DHS, 2019). HSIN allowed the CG to send response requests to different 
agencies, manage operations, respond to incidents, and share information.  
The volume of emergency calls during the initial stages of Harvey’s response 
efforts overwhelmed the capacity of the response network. Houston’s 911 call systems 
were inundated so severely that the USCG District Eight Command Center’s phone number 
was broadcasted to the public through news sources and social media, and excess 911 calls 
were routed to the Coast Guard (LANTAREA, 2017). In response to the increasing demand 
on local phone systems, Sector Houston–Galveston and Port Arthur Command Center 911 
calls were forwarded to the National Command Center and LANTAREA (LANTAREA, 
2017). Despite not being qualified, trained, or staffed to handle 911 calls, the Coast Guard 
answered nearly 7,200 calls for assistance (LANTAREA, 2017). 
Response to the 911 calls almost immediately inhibited normal crisis response 
operations and the ability to communicate, not just internally within the Coast Guard, but 
with partner agencies as well (USCG 8th District, 2017). HSIN was efficient at capturing 
the information allowing for a response, but could not track who was responding, or 
whether the mission was completed. The USCG then shifted to GeoSuite, a FEMA 
contingency response software system. GeoSuite allowed call data to be placed on a shared 
map, accessible by all responders, and prioritized the calls based on need (USCG, 2018a). 
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It also provided response pilots in aircraft a “heat map” that displayed where activity 
occurred and where response efforts needed to focus (USCG 8th District, 2017). Although 
GeoSuite was a tool that increased efficiency, it was still unable to track the assets in the 
field. The inability to track response assets restricted planners from tasking the nearest asset 
to the most urgent cases (USCG, 2018a). 
The loss of Internet at Sector Houston-Galveston created another challenge for the 
USCG during Hurricane Harvey’s response. Planners and responders used a wide array of 
Coast Guard–owned and personal devices to manage the vast amount of information 
generated during the life-saving efforts. Coast Guard members used their own devices for 
case management, situational awareness, on-scene surveys, and nearly every aspect of 
disaster response (United States Coast Guard, 2018).  
Another aspect of information and knowledge management during Harvey’s 
response was the growing use of social media. The Coast Guard received distress calls and 
calls for service from a variety of social media platforms. Although social media is not a 
part of the distress altering system or monitored as a means of notification, the Coast Guard 
realizes that its use could improve response and ultimately help save lives (USCG, 2018a).  
2. Needs Assessment 
The needs assessment for Hurricane Harvey began before the hurricane made 
landfall. No agency could forecast the volume of rain with which Texas would inundated; 
however, FEMA, local agencies, state emergency operation centers, and the USCG pre-
positioned assets and supplies in anticipation of follow-on requirements. The Coast Guard 
has a long history with domestic disaster response, specifically hurricane response. Its 
determination of needs is predicated on historical requirements for widespread flooding, 
damage to infrastructure, and the common impacts of significant hurricane events. The 
Coast Guard focused on the pre-determined requirements and statutory missions of search 
and rescue, distressed persons and medical evacuations, port damage assessments and 
conditions, the state of the aids to navigation structure, and emerging pollution response 
requirements (USCG, 2012). Although the service provided some disaster response 
supplies, it did not focus on the logistics response component of the hurricane response. 
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As with Haiti, the service recognized that its response should focus on its core 
competencies. 
The USCG performed damage assessments during the torrential rainfall and 
immediately after the hurricane’s passage (Johnson, 2018). Coast Guardsmen at Sector 
Houston–Galveston provided the first port damage assessments and provided AToN survey 
and repairs. Cutters such as the CGC Harry Claiborne conducted port assessments and 
surveys to identify impacts to regulated port facilities, oil spills, chemical releases, or 
restrictions to navigation (USCG, 2017a). Their presence served to assess the condition of 
navigational infrastructure, reposition or repair aids to navigation, and remove obstructions 
to allow the free flow of vessel traffic to the shipping channel (USCG, 2017a). MH-60s, 
MH-65s, HC-144s, and C-130s provided aerial imagery and real-time footage of the 
hurricane’s aftermath. Although the USCG provided damage assessment throughout the 
response, their main objective was conducting SAR operations (USCG 8th District, 2017).  
Organizations like FEMA, the National Geodetic Survey, National Weather 
Service, and NOAA conducted more in-depth damage assessments. NOAA provided 
critical aerial imagery to determine the extent of storm and flood damage by comparing 
before and after images of affected areas (NOAA, 2017).  
Once SAR operations commenced on September 7, 2017, the USCG worked 
alongside the EPA and other federal, state, and local partners to address further pollution 
concerns (USCG 8th District, 2017). The CG responded to over 800 pollution 
discrepancies and were pivotal in the overall assessment of pollution within the flooded 
AOR (USCG 8th District, 2017).  
3. Supply 
The supply capability includes “procurement, staging, warehousing, and inventory 
management” (Apte & Yoho, 2012, p. 11). The nature of Hurricane Harvey and the ability 
for NOAA and other agencies to better predict hurricane travel patterns allowed for the 
pre-positioning of common supply goods. The USCG and other governmental agencies 
began the pre-positioning of supplies and personnel prior to the hurricane’s landfall on 
August 25, 2017 (FEMA, 2017). The Coast Guard’s contribution to the response effort 
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focused on its ability to pre-stage personnel, equipment, and response assets and then to 
sustain those assets throughout the operation. The majority of goods, such as water, food, 
medical supplies, and temporary shelters were provided and managed by FEMA. In support 
of affected persons, FEMA supplied three million meals, three million liters of water, 9,900 
blankets, 8,840 cots, and 10,300 hygiene kits (FEMA, 2017).  
4. Deployment and Distribution 
As previously discussed in the Haitian earthquake analysis section, the Coast Guard 
does not have the assets or the requirement to provide significant airlift and sealift 
capabilities. The USCG’s deployment and distribution of aid or relief supplies are minimal 
compared to the DoD. During the response to Hurricane Harvey, Coast Guard heavy lift 
assets primarily focused on the transport of relief personnel and supplies, equipment, and 
materiel in support of those personnel. Coast Guard HC-130s operating out of John Brooks 
Regional Airport in Beaumont, TX, and Aviation Training Center in Mobile, AL, were 
utilized to deliver relief supplies and relocate displaced persons to refugee shelters 
established by federal, state, and local agencies (USCG, 2017b). All rotary-wing assets 
were also employed to deliver minimal relief supplies and rescue and transport displaced 
persons.  
5. Health Service Support 
The Coast Guard’s core capability is to perform search and rescue and MEDEVAC 
operations across a breadth of operational environments. This means the CG response to 
Hurricane Harvey reflects the objective of disaster response in relieving pain and suffering 
and the prevention of further fatalities (Apte & Yoho, 2012). Although the service lacks 
significant health services support or medical capabilities, it has a unique ability to rapidly 
respond to disaster and transport personnel in need to a higher level of medical care. The 
CG deployed 2,060 personnel, 50 aircraft, 75 boats, and 29 cutters to Harrison County 
(LANTAREA, 2017). SAR operations helped rescue 11,022 people and 1,384 pets 
(FEMA, 2017).  
Unique assets, like the special purpose craft-airboats (SPC-AIR), allowed the Coast 
Guard to maneuver through the dangerous floodwaters across Texas. The SPC-AIRs allow 
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the vessel to traverse shallow waters otherwise inaccessible by standard watercraft 
(Collins, 2018). These craft were critical in conducting SAR efforts. Sixteen-foot flood 
punt boats were also invaluable while helping distressed persons. A flood punt team from 
Marine Safety Unit Paducah, KY, reportedly rescued over 850 people in the initial stages 
of Hurricane Harvey’s humanitarian assistance (Collins, 2018). The ability of the punt 
boats to navigate the floodwaters made them the ideal asset for rescuing displaced persons. 
Rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets provided much needed aerial medical 
evacuations throughout the response efforts and transported distressed personnel to areas 
of safety of medical care. Urban SAR provided difficulties not frequently practiced during 
training events. There were multiple cases where Coast Guard personnel were required to 
use axes and chainsaws in order to break into an attic where people were trapped by the 
floodwaters (Collins, 2018).  
6. Collaboration and Governance 
On August 23, 2017, President Donald J. Trump declared a major disaster in the 
state of Texas and directed federal aid to augment regional recover efforts (White House, 
2017). The federal disaster declaration authorized federal agencies to deploy assets and 
personnel to support the hurricane response and recovery. Some of the agencies responding 
to the hurricane were the DHS, USCG, FEMA, HHS, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, 
Department of Energy, DoD, Department of Agriculture, American Red Cross, and nearly 
300 volunteer organizations.  
Apte and Yoho defined collaboration as “a process in which two or more 
organizations work together to achieve a common goal” (2012, p. 13). The damage 
Hurricane Harvey inflicted on Texas created one of the largest multi-agency relief 
operations since Hurricane Katrina (LANTAREA, 2017). Apte and Yoho further defined 
governance as “being achieved through command and control or pre-established logistics 
networks and supply chains” (2012, p. 13). The NRF, NIMS, ICS, and local and state 
emergency operation centers are all systems that establish the governance allowing for the 
collaboration required to respond to disasters like Hurricane Harvey.  
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Rear Admiral Paul Thomas told a special House Homeland Security Committee 
that 
there was strong coordination between federal, state, and local officials with 
FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the Army Corps of Engineering. ... The Coast 
Guard is uniquely positioned to operate across the response spectrum and 
serve as a bridge between the Department of Defense and local, state, and 
other federal agencies, and we did just that during Harvey. (United States 
Congress Committee on Homeland Security, 2018, p. 2)  
The coordination and governance of the USCG proved pivotal with the inundating 
of the state’s emergence phone centers. The ability of the USCG to take excess 911 calls, 
although unqualified to do so, greatly assisted the relief effort. One of the major challenges 
with the Coast Guard effort lay with its inability to track response asset location and thus 
effectively coordinate with partner agencies. The Coast Guard deployed a fleet of flood 
punt boats without the ability to track their locations. The inability to track response assets 
made it difficult for planners to task urgent calls to the nearest asset, and assets from 
different agencies often responded to the same calls for assistance (USCG, 2018a). The 
lack of tracking capability also affected the response and coordination with the multitude 




Following the analysis of the two disasters, it is clear they differed in many ways, 
yet shared core similarities. Differing organizational frameworks and relief and response 
requirements between the two events significantly contributed to the Coast Guard’s role in 
each of the essential services and capabilities. The complexities of disasters influence the 
effectiveness of a response framework and the synergy of information and relief 
distribution. The national response framework effectively defines the coordination of 
agencies, the use of assets, and the distribution of aid among response organizations, while 
the international response framework introduces challenges with the myriad of 
participating and dissimilar organizations. Within either disaster response construct, the 
fundamental capabilities and capacity of the Coast Guard contribute to crucial components 
of disaster response, and leveraging its unique capabilities are invaluable to an effective 
response. 
A. HAITI EARTHQUAKE SUMMARY 
Compared to a majority of organizations with an ability to respond to HA/DR, the 
Coast Guard can rapidly divert or allocate resources with little delay. Response to sudden-
onset disasters limits an organization’s ability to respond promptly with the appropriate 
resources.  
The Coast Guard has a unique ability to rapidly assign and divert resources, 
implement a contingency response structure, and disseminate information within a 
standardized, but adaptable, response network. The Haiti earthquake demonstrated the 
Coast Guard’s unique ability to conduct port assessments and its aptitude for port 
reconstitution, operations, and vessel management. Haiti’s port condition was a critical 
factor to the function of the massive response supply chain, and the Coast Guard’s expertise 
is key to enabling the flow of resources. 
The presence of military services can often bring trepidation among NGOs and the 
people and government of the local populace (Van Wassenhove, 2006). The Coast Guard 
capitalized on its relatively neutral position as a life-saving service to present a sign of 
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hope, rather than occupation, to the people of Haiti. The service excelled in its ability to 
liaise and coordinate with a wide range of agencies, organizations, and the local 
government to complete its mission. Despite established relationships and liaisons, the 
Coast Guard struggled with information management throughout this operation 
(LANTARTEA, 2011). Assets and personnel fell under a wide variety of agencies, and the 
DoD decentralization made it challenging to maintain an adequate common operational 
picture. Further adding to the complexity, limited means of communications for assets 
assigned in-country further delayed the Coast Guard leadership’s ability to maintain 
continuous situational awareness of the response effort. 
The Coast Guard recognizes it cannot contribute the same level of operational or 
logistics response capacity as the DoD (LANTAREA, 2011) but recognized the importance 
of assessing and re-opening the port of Haiti to facilitate a massive response effort. The 
airport and seaport provided limited access to an already limited infrastructure. Without 
access to either, response efforts would be severely limited. The Coast Guard’s ability to 
assess, reconstitute and coordinate port operations is a unique competency few other 
organizations have the capacity to execute. Port operations are a core competency of the 
service, and its experience in vessel management and inter-agency and governmental 
operations expedited the logistics efforts of the overall response organization.  
Table 1 summarizes the initial response requirements and capabilities and 
competencies the USCG provided. Items identified as unique capabilities are core 
competencies that are unique or unmatched within the overall response organization and 







Table 1. USCG Haiti Response 
Haiti Response 




• Status of 
communications  
• Affected population  
• Damage Assessment  




• Rapid response 
• Staffing of emergency 
response liaison personnel 
• Response structure 
(ICS/IMT)  
• DoS/Haitian LNOs  
 
 
• Rapid response 





• Situation on the 
ground  





• Port assessment  
• Initial reports/Damage 
survey 
 
• Initial damage reports 
• Port assessment 
Supply 
 
• Initial response 
supply  
 
• Potable water  
• Medical supplies  






• Air, ground, and 




• Fixed-wing cargo transport 
• Limited sealift  
• Port reconstitution  
• Aid distribution  





• Port reconstitution 
• Vessel management 
• Interagency/governmental 




• Urgent medical 
treatment  
 
• Medical Evacuations & 
transport, SAR 
• Est. ad-hoc medical facility  













• Established relationships 
(Haitian CG)  
• MTSRU port management  
 
 
• LNO Interagency/government 
coordination 
• MTSRU port management 
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B. HURRICANE HARVEY SUMMARY 
Although the characteristics and needs of disaster events around the world often 
parallel each other, an event occurring within the United States benefits from a well-
established response framework, access to a wide variety of readily available and numerous 
assets, and a robust and broad infrastructure network. Although sudden-onset disasters, 
such as hurricanes, bring a level of unpredictability, FEMA and other related response 
organizations are well postured to provide support. The existence of the NRF, ICS, and 
NIMS allows for a well-established, responsive, and cohesive employment of resources. 
Compared to an international disaster, the Coast Guard’s role is more defined, and the 
service’s response is once again dependent on the historical needs of national disasters, 
including flooding, hurricanes, and weather-related disasters. 
The Coast Guard’s planning, training, and proficiency with the NRF, NIMS, and 
ICS allow for a scalable response to any disaster and allow the service to provide 
exceptional service during a disaster response. Disasters occurring within the confines of 
the United States facilitate the use of the ICS among the vast majority of response 
organizations and, therefore, provide an efficient synergy of information and resource 
requirements and allocation.  
The Coast Guard relies on historical disaster response requirements and potential 
outcomes when determining the requirements of a storm. As a service, it heavily relies 
upon statutory authorities that give it the flexibility to stage a response rapidly and without 
explicit direction from federal authorities. Its responsibilities during the storm are well 
practiced and well defined. The service established the response structure and 
prepositioned assets and personnel ahead of the storm in likely locations and postured the 
assets for immediate response. Known requirements, such as port assessments, search and 
rescue, and restoring aids to navigation, to name a few, are frequent demands the service 
anticipates. The ability and flexibility to position assets and personnel close to the response 
area is a unique ability the Coast Guard possesses, especially compared to its DoD 
counterparts. Ultimately, its role in national disaster events is well defined and provides a 
more succinct asset to the overall response framework compared to international responses 
that lack a standard response structure. 
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Table 2 summarizes the initial response requirements and capabilities and 
competencies the USCG provided. Items identified as unique capabilities are core 
competencies that are unique or unmatched within the overall response organization and 
structure (Apte & Yoho, 2012). 
Table 2. USCG Hurricane Harvey Response 
Hurricane Harvey Response 




• Status of communications  
• Affected population  
• Damage Assessment  






  Initial damage assessments 
  ICP and IMT framework 
  Flexibility to adapt to unique 
information challenges 














• Situation on the ground  
• Establishment of logistics 
entry points  
• SAR  
• Pollution Assessment 
 
 
• Aerial damage surveys  
• Port assessments 
• Real-time flood assessments 
 
  Port assessments 








  Potable water  
  Medical supplies  






• Air, ground, and sea 
delivery of supplies  
 
 
• Fixed-wing cargo transport 
• Aids to Navigation 
• Port reconstitution 
 
 
  Port reconstitution 









• Medical Evacuations & 
transport, SAR 




• Rotary-wing EMT 





• Information exchange & 




• Interagency coordination  






C. USCG UNIQUE CAPABILITIES 
The Coast Guard’s Title 14 authorities allow for a rapid response to almost any 
disaster event, nationally or internationally. Comparatively, the DoD must seek USG 
approval before supporting HA/DR operations while the Coast Guard, anticipating the need 
for its statutory missions, acts to support those demands. The service’s ability to deploy 
assets quickly, either before or shortly after the disaster event, satisfies two components of 
the USG response. First, the Coast Guard’s universal perception as a life-saving service 
and its appearance on the scene of a disaster presents an outwardly neutral sign of U.S. 
assistance. Secondly, the assets arriving first on the scene provide critical assessments of 
the disaster and its immediate demands. The Coast Guard’s ability to rapidly respond has 
the potential to significantly contribute to the management of information and the 
determination of needs for the affected population.  
Disasters occurring within the United States involve a wide variety of federal, state, 
and local agencies and have the benefit of the NRF, NIMS, and ICS. Due to the centralized 
framework, NIMS and its integration of all agencies, resources, assets, and supply and 
demand facilitate efficient management during the response effort. An advantage to the 
NIMS and ICS is a universal language among participating organizations and attempts to 
align the needs of the affected population. International relief efforts routinely involve a 
mix of international NGOs, foreign governments and militaries, U.S. federal agencies, and 
the DoD. Unfortunately, non-U.S. federal agencies, including the DoD, do not use, nor are 
they familiar with, the ICS. 
The use of a nation’s airports and seaports are vital to the support of a massive 
response supply chain of personnel, resources, and equipment. The Coast Guard’s 
experience with port assessment, operations, and recovery, vessel management, and aids 
to navigation make it uniquely suited to perform these roles via its MTSRU and Gulf Strike 
teams. The Coast Guard possesses the expertise, assets, and deployable teams to facilitate 
joint-recovery operations with the host nation government and organizations. Following 
national disaster events affecting seaports or waterways, and regardless of the disaster 
logistics requirements, the Coast Guard will complete an assessment of the ports and aids 
to navigation. 
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D. THE JOINT ENVIRONMENT 
As a military service, the Coast Guard possesses a unique set of capabilities to 
HA/DR and despite differing demands of disaster events, serves a relatively narrow but 
well-defined role compared to its federal agency and DoD response partners. Response 
organization and frameworks differ significantly between a national and international 
disaster response, yet the services and operations provided by the Coast Guard share 
standard capabilities to supplement an appropriate response in a joint-environment. 
However, the DoD enterprise needs to understand the unique similarities and differences 
between the organizations to best utilize the capabilities of the Coast Guard. 
The DoD provides a set of core capabilities and capacities within HA/DR that few 
organizations can match. Due to its size and structure, USAID may assign the DoD as the 
lead response organization during initial recovery efforts, and in the case of Haiti, assumed 
tactical control of a portion of Coast Guard assets and personnel. The Coast Guard’s 
interoperability with the military services, vast experience with interagency and 
governmental interaction, and unique capabilities set it apart as a response organization. 
The Coast Guard provides vital components of the initial response and enables a 
critical facet of the recovery effort and response supply chain, particularly port 
assessments, port reconstitution, AToN, and vessel management. As previously noted, the 
ICS structure is a core capability the DoD does not possess with exception to National 
Guard personnel. 
The substantial utilization of rotary-wing aircraft for aerial surveillance, search and 
rescue, MEDEVAC, and relief supply transport, often require the use of military aircraft. 
The Coast Guard’s aircraft are uniquely suited to perform multi-mission roles satisfying all 
of these mission sets. The standardization of USCG rotor-wing aircraft to include a hoist, 
medical kits, EMTs, and rescue personnel allow great flexibility and efficiency for the 
response organization. During Hurricane Harvey, Coast Guard and Customs, Border 
Patrol, and Air Force fixed-wing aircraft provided a conduit and dispatch capability for the 
state EOC air-mission assignment. Of the rotary-wing aircraft in the air, few provided the 
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standardized configuration of the Coast Guard and its multi-mission capability. Figure 12 
highlights the similarities and differences between the organizations.  
 
1 Limited to surface search radar and forward infrared radar (FLIR) 
2 Cutter crew or specialized teams 
3 Limited capability, infrastructure 
4 In conjunction with local partners 
 
Figure 12. Humanitarian and Core Competencies: DoD and USCG. 
Adapted from Apte & Yoho (2012). 
E. SUMMARY 
Both disaster events required a significant deployment of assets to support recovery 
and immediate life-saving and medical requirements, along with a logistics infrastructure 
to sustain a significant response effort. Although the Coast Guard’s relative size restricts it 
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from the employment of assets on a scale that rivals the DoD and other militaries, its core 
capabilities and competencies supplement critical components of the essential services and 
capabilities required to meet the supply and demand of a humanitarian and disaster relief. 
F. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
• Cost analysis of Coast Guard asset deployment, analyzing volume and 
duration, relating to the essential needs and capabilities framework. 
• Optimization of Coast Guard asset of deployment for HA/DR based on 
unique capabilities and yet-to-be-defined definition of mission success. 
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APPENDIX. EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION 
Table 3. Emergency Support Functions and ESF Coordinator Tables. 
Source: DHS (2016). 
 
Table 3 cont’d on next page 
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